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"Thus, the following things are by natural law common to all-the air, running
water, the sea, and consequently the seashore. No one therefore is forbidden access
to the seashore, provided he abstains from injury to houses, monuments, and buildings
generally; for these are not like the sea itself subject o the law ofnations. " 2
"The general rule oflaw is, that the noblest ofhuman productions-knowledge, truths
ascertained, conceptions, and ideas-become, after voluntary communication to others,
free as the air to common use. "
INTRODUCTION
On January 1, 2019, every copyrighted work published for the first time in the
United States in 1923 entered the public domain.' The works newly in the public
domain included Cecil B. DeMille's first silent version of the film The Ten
Commandments, The Ego and the Id by Sigmund Freud, and Agatha Christie's The
Murder on the Links.5 January 1, 2019 marked the first time in twenty years that a
whole year's worth of copyrighted works entered the public domain.' Much has
been written about how the passage of the Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998
("CTEA") significantly curtailed the flow of content into the public domain.' It was
widely understood at the time of the passage of the CTEA that The Walt Disney
Company was a major proponent of the CTEA, and motivated by the desire to
2 INST. OF JUSTIANA 2.1.1 (J. B. Moyle trans., 1913), https://www.gutenberg.org/files/5983/5983-
h/5983-h.htm#link2H 4 0029.
Int'l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
4 Public Domain Day 2019, CTR. FOR STUDY PUB DOMAIN,
https://law.duke.edulcspd/publicdomainday/2019/ [https://perma.cc/CR45-DJXQ].
Nick Douglas, These 1923 Copyrighted Works Enter the Public Domain in 2019, LIFE HACKER
(Apr. 13, 2018), https://lifehacker.com/these-1923-copyrighted-works-enter-the-public-domain-in-
1825241296 [https://perma.cc/TZ8D-MXVP].
6 Glenn Fleishman, A Landslide of Classic Ai Is About to Enter the Public Domain, AIANnc (Apr. 8,2018
https/www.delantic.cm/technology/archive/2018/04/copywntten-so-dont-copy-me/557420/
[https//permaccd8EGZ-MNDJ ] ("The Great American Novel enters the public domain on January 1, 2019-quite
literally. Not the concept, but the book by William Carlos Williams. It will be joined by hundreds of thousands of
other books, musical scores, and films first published in the United States during 1923. It's the first time since 1998
for a mass shift to the public domain of material pmotected under copyright It's also the beginning of a new annual
tradition: For several decades from 2019 onward, each New Year's Day will unleash a fill year's worth of works
published 95 years earlier."); see also Jennifer Jenkins, In Ambiguous Battle: The Promise (And Pathos) ofPublic
Domain Day, 2014, 12 DUKE L. & TECH. REv. 1, 2-3 (2013) ("For works published between 1923 and 1977 that
were still in copyright the terms were extended to 95 years from publication, keeping them out of the public
domain for an additional 20 years. 'Te public domain was fiozen in time, and artifacts from 1923 won't enter it
until 2019.").
See, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, et al., The Constitutionality of Copyright Term Extension: How Long
is Too Long?, 18 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 651, 659-60 (2000) ("The CTEA's extension of copyright
terms does not increase the benefits to the public from the labors of authors because it gives no real
present incentive to authors. By removing from the public domain for another twenty years a massive
body of works, the CTEA dramatically limits access to the public commons.").
8 Brigid McMenamin, Mickey's Mine!, FORBES (Aug. 23, 1999),
https://www.forbes.com/forbes/1999/0823/6404043a.html#4c01 84ae3018 [https://perma.cc/8FYR-
Vol. 107630
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keep Steamboat Willie, which premiered at New York City's Colony Theatre on
November 18, 1928,9 and would have entered the public domain on January 1,
2004,io out of the public domain for as long as possible." As things stand,
Steamboat Willie will enter the public domain on January 1, 2024.12 As we again
approach the expiration of the copyright on Steamboat Willie and other iconic
works, on which content owners have built very lucrative businesses, it's important
to consider the extent to which content entering the public domain will actually be
available for anyone "to release . . ., mash [] up with other work, or sell [] with no
restriction."3
In the twenty years since the CTEA's passage, jurisprudence pertaining to the
use of works in the public domain has marched along. Specifically, the cases in
which a content owner argues that the use of a work in the public domain
constitutes infringement of a work that remains protected by copyright are of
particular salience in considering the breadth of access the public is likely to have
to works newly added to the public domain. In one particularly famous instance, a
copyright owner claimed that use of a work in the public domain infringed existing
copyrights in related works, successfully, without ever filing suit.14 The story
DS36] ("No Wonder Walt Disney, whose most valuable characters were set to lapse into the public
domain, devoted millions to lobbying and campaign contributions as Congress weighed the idea."); see
also Daren Fonda, Copyright's Crusader, BOSTON GLOBE MAG. (Aug. 29, 1999),
http://homepages.law.asu.edu/-dkajala/OpposingCopyrightExtension/commentary/Fonda8-29-99.html
[https://perma.cc/4GW3-QD6P ] ("Many of these copyright owners had made it clear to Congress that
they wanted an extension bill passed. According to the nonprofit Center for Responsive Politics, in
Washington, media companies and their political action committees contributed more than $6.5 million
to members of Congress during the 1997-98 election cycle.... Disney was one of the biggest donors.
Eight of the Senate bill's 12 sponsors received contributions from Disney, as did 10 of the original
House bill's 13 sponsors. Democrat Patrick Leahy of Vermont, the ranking minority member on the
Senate Judiciary Committee (which passed the bill) and a man who very publicly forgoes PAC
contributions, got nearly $20,000 from individual Disney employees.").
9 Keith Gluck, The Birth of a Mouse, THE WALT DISNEY FAMILY MUSEUM (Nov. 18, 2012),
https://www.waltdisney.org/blog/birth-mouse [https://perma.cc/KK8D-P5M4].
"oAlan IC Ota, Disney in Washington: The Mouse that Roars, CNN (Aug. 10, 1998),
http://edition.con.com/ALLPOLITICS/1998/08/10/cq/disney.html [httpsd//pernacc/Z5Y4-VZ5F]-("The
copyright for Disney's crown jewel, Mickey Mouse, will expire after 2003, 75 years after the appearance in 1928
of the Disney cartoon that launched Mickey's golden career, 'Steamboat Willie."').
" See, e.g., id ("On a recent Tuesday afternoon when the Senate halls were humming, Walt Disney
Co. chairman Michael D. Eisner dropped in for an unpublicized chat with Senate Majority Leader Trent
Lott. What did Eisner want? Plenty, it turned out. At the top of his list that includes tax breaks, visas for
animal trainers and transportation to Disney theme parks, was a request for Congress to help his
company's highest priority: HR2589, a bill to extend the soon-to-expire copyright on Mickey
Mouse-Disney's most precious asset.").
12 Stephen Carlisle, Mickey's Headed to the Public Domain! But Will He Go Quietly?, NOVA
SOUTHERN UNIV. (Oct. 17, 2014), http://copyrightnova.edulmickey-public-domain/#note-676-3
[https://perma.cc/REK7-UBT4].
" Fleishman, supra note 6.
14 Sam Williams, Should Auld Copyrights Be Forgot, UPSIDE TODAY (Dec. 22, 1999),
http://homepages.law.asu.edu/-dkarjala/OpposingCopyrightExtension/publicdomain/Williams I
2-22-99.html ("Jump cut to Feb. 6, 1975. After languishing for nearly two decades in the studio vaults, 'Ifs a
Wonderful Life' fell into the public domain. . . . Republic Pictures, ... embarked on a decades-long battle to win
back its lost asset ... Ultimately, the attorneys at Republic found a legal back door. Although the film had entered
2018-2019 631
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behind why those of us who grew up in the 1970s and 1980s couldn't watch
television during the holiday season without encountering the 1946 film It's a
Wonderful Life, and why it's been shown only sparingly since the 1990s, is a
cautionary tale for anyone interested in maximizing access to public domain
content.'5
As the story goes, while the film was widely acclaimed at the time of its
release, it underperformed at the box office.'6 For reasons now lost to the ages,
when the copyright was up for renewal in 1974, twenty-eight years after it was
initially issued in 1946, no renewal was filed." Therefore, the film fell into the
public domain.'" In no time, the film was a staple on public broadcasting and
network television during the Christmas season.'9 It would remain in the public
domain and ubiquitous on television during the holidays until the early 1990s when
the successor to the original copyright owner acquired the rights to the film's
musical score and the short story on which the film was based.20 Thereafter, the
successor entered into an exclusive agreement with NBC and otherwise enforced
against uses of the film, including a proposal to develop a sequel.2' In this article
the public domain, the movie soundtrack was still under studio control. For the last decade, Republic used this fact
to drive rival distributors out of the market and reestablish sole control of the broadcast rights. In 1994, Republic,
now a property of Spelling Entertainment, licensed those rights to NBC. And the network has shown 'Its a
Wonderful Life' as part of its holiday programming for the last five years.").
15 See STEPHEN COX, IT'S A WONDERFUL LIFE: A MEMORY BOOK 111-15 (2003) (explaining that
"Television stations across the nation began airing [It's a Wonderful Life] regularly" after a clerical
error led its copyright to lapse and the "legal property" fell into the public domain).
16 Williams, supra note 14 ("Although the film garnered several Academy Award
nominations--including Best Director, Best Picture and Best Actor-it was a commercial flop in the theaters").
" Williams, supra note 13 ("Movie historians disagree on the reason behind [the failure to renew].
Some attribute it to a clerical error. Others credit simple disinterest on the part of studio management.").
1 Why Wonderful Life Comes But Once a Year, SLATE (Dec. 21, 1999), https://slate.com/news-and-
politics/1 999/12/why-wonderful-life-comes-but-once-a-year.html [https://perma.cc/56C2-77V5] ("It's a
Wonderful Life entered the public domain by accident. In 1946, when the movie was filmed, U.S.
copyright protection lasted 28 years and could be renewed for another 28 years by filing some
paperwork and paying a nominal fee. However, Republic Pictures, the original copyright owner and
producer of Wonderful Life, neglected to renew the 1946 copyright in 1974. So, the film entered the
public domain.").
" Roger Ebert, Great Movie: It's a Wonderful Life, ROGER EBERT.COM (Jan. 1, 1999),
https://www.rogerebert.com/reviews/great-movie-its-a-wonderful-life-1946 [https://perma.cc/YX3P-
GSXU] ("Because the movie is no longer under copyright, any television station that can get its hands
on a print of the movie can show it, at no cost, as often as it wants to. And that has led in the last decade
to the rediscovery of Frank Capra's once-forgotten film, and its elevation into a Christmas tradition. PBS
stations were the first to jump on the bandwagon in the early 1970s, using the saga of the small-town
hero George Bailey as counter-programming against expensive network holiday specials.").
20 Jay Bobbin, 'Wonderfid Life' to Flash Before Our Eyes Only Once, BALTIMORE SUN (Dec. 10, 1994),
http://articles.baltimoresun.corn/1994-12-10/features/1994344056_1_wonderful-life-george-bailey-republic-
pictures [https1/penacc/923L-CMA9] ("A few years ago, however, Republic Pictures became the legal owner of
the picture by purchasing the rights to the original story ('The Greatest Gift,' by Philip Van Doren Stern) and the
film's Dimitri Tiomkin music score. Republic gave TV stations and video distributors a short grace period to get rid
of bootleg copies of the movie.").
21 Id. ("Now, NBC has acquired exclusive rights to broadcast 'Its a Wonderful Life."'). On the
sequel saga, see Sean O'Connell, It's A Wonderful Life Sequel Will Not Happen Without a Fight From
Paramount, CINEMA BLEND (2014), https://www.cinemablend.com/new/It-Wonderful-Life-Sequel-
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I'd like to suggest that an ancient property principle-the public trust
doctrine-might act as an antidote to the story of how It's a Wonderful Life was in
the public domain until it wasn't. Plainly stated, and in its narrowest sense, the
public trust doctrine provides that all land covered by navigable waters is held in
trust for the people to use.22 Therefore, property owners on the shore are
obliged to allow members of the public to cross their private property in order to
reach the adjoining waterway.23 The public trust doctrine has long been recognized
because public access to navigable waterways is seen as a public good.24 How
much more so is access to the store of knowledge upon which our culture is built,
a public good? I would argue that, in fact, access to that is even more important
than access to navigable waters.
In this article I will endeavor to supplement the relatively sparse body of
existing scholarship considering the applicability of the public trust doctrine to
the conception of the public domain in copyright law.25 While Sharon Sandeen
argued in 2001 that States ought to hold any intellectual property they own in trust
for the public,26 here I would like to argue that recent decisions, including the
Northern District of Georgia's and Eleventh Circuit's decisions in the Code
Happen-Fight-From-Paramount-40381.html [https://perma.cc/LVR2-FSUY].
2 Gerald Torres & Nathan Bellinger, The Public Trust: The Law's DNA, 4 WAKE FOREST J. L. &
POL'Y 281, 286 (2014) ("The public trust doctrine is meant to protect those resources that have an
inherently public character and are not owned in the same way as traditional property. Early cases
recognized marine resources, tidal waters and the submerged land beneath them, and navigable waters
as resources protected by the public trust doctrine.") (citing Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387
(1892); Martin v. Waddell's Lessee, 41 U.S. 367 (1842); Arnoldv. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1 (1821)).
23 See Michael C. Blumm, The Public Trust Doctrine and Private Property: The Accommodation
Principle, 27 PACE ENVTL. L. REv. 649, 663 (2010) ("More commonplace than transferring fee simples
into defeasible fees are court decisions that interpret the public trust doctrine to impose a [sic] easement
on fee simple estates. Perhaps the most vivid example is the New Jersey Supreme Court's recognition in
Matthews v. Bay Head that the doctrine burdened private beaches with a public easement. The scope of
this easement was not merely access to the ocean but also included recreational rights to sunbathe on the
beach.") (footnotes omitted).
24 See James Olson, All Aboard: Navigating the Course for Universal Adoption of the Public Trust
Doctrine, 15 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 135, 143 n.19 (2014) ("The principles of the 'Commons' assert that no
one owns water; instead it is a public good that belongs in common to all living things, including future
generations.").
25 It is interesting to note here that while scholars have not taken up the applicability of the public
trust doctrine to copyright, specifically, or intellectual property more broadly, the concept has been
utilized by lawyers arguing against specific copyright legislation. See Plaintiffs' Reply Memorandum in
Support of Motion For Judgment on the Pleadings or in the Alternative for Summary Judgment at 52-
67, Eldred v. Reno, 74 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 1999) (No. 1:99CV00065 JLG). Scholars considering this
argument have done so largely within the framework of Law & Economics. See, e.g., Richard A.
Epstein, The Dubious Constitutionality of the Copyright Term Extension Act, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 123,
154-58 (2002) ("Giveaways are bad business. They are inconsistent with any system of constitutional
governance. Once that simple point is recognized, then it hardly matters whether we start with the
Copyright Clause, the First Amendment, or even the public trust doctrine."). In this article, I will utilize
the framework of human flourishing.
26 Sharon K. Sandeen, Preserving the Public Trust in State-Owned Intellectual Property: A
Recommendation for Legislative Action, 32 MCGEORGE L. REv. 385, 396-418 (2001) (proposing
legislation that "sets forth a general rule of public dedication" of state-owned intellectual property).
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Revision Commission cases,27 suggest a deeper dive into the utility of the public
trust doctrine, as it relates to intellectual property, generally, and copyright,
specifically, is warranted. In an unpublished article, Haochen Sun argued that
introducing the public trust doctrine into copyright law would "promote the ethical
values of guardianship, responsibility, and community."28 I will seek to add to
Sun's contribution by applying the public trust doctrine to a specific set of cases in
which courts are asked to consider whether the use of content in the public domain
infringes upon copyrights in content that remains protected. While filling the gaps
in the existing literature, I would also like to suggest that the reconceiving of the
public domain in the image of the public trust doctrine has conceptual as well as
doctrinal and pragmatic utility. I will further consider whether those benefits
outweigh the potential challenges including the not insignificant hurdle of how
those interested in ensuring broad access to content in the public domain can
effectuate that given the significant disparity in resources and coordination relative
to content owners.2 9
In a broader sense, this paper will engage in the thought experiment of taking
the notion of copyright as property seriously and applying the longstanding
principle of the public trust doctrine to public domain works. While others have
suggested that a property framework for copyright specifically and intellectual
property broadly does not necessarily lead to expansion of rights,30 in this piece I
intend to demonstrate that theoretical claim with a practical and specific application
of the public trust doctrine to questions of access in the context of intellectual
property.3 ' In Part I, I will situate the argument for analogizing to the public trust
doctrine within the existing scholarship on intellectual property as property. Part II
of the article undertakes to consider the history and theory underlying the public
trust doctrine in order to make the case that the ancient principle has and should be
put to some modem uses, namely, in the context of intellectual property. In Part III,
27 Code Revision Comm'n v. Pub.Resource.Org, Inc., 906 F.3d 1229, 1243 (11th Cir. 2018)
(reversing the district court's holding and finding that the annotations of the Official Code of George
"while not having the force of law, are part and parcel of the law" and are "constructively authored by
the People", and thus, "uncopyrightable"); Code Revision Comm'n v. Pub.Resource.Org, Inc., 244 F.
Supp. 3d 1350, 1355-57 (N.D. Ga. 2017) (enjoining from the public the use of the Official Code of
Georgia Annotated, or any of its versions, because the court found those works copyrightable).
28 Haochen Sun, Toward a Public Trust Doctrine in Copyright Law 4 (Cornell L. Sch. Inter-U.
Graduate Student Conf. Papers, Paper 36, 2009), http://scholarship.law.comell.edulips clacp/36
[https://perma.cc/NT68-PYL5].
2 9 See, e.g., Dennis S. Karjala, Judicial Review of Copyright Term Extension Legislation, 36 LOY. L.
A. L. REV. 199, 233 (2002) ("It is easy to see why this happened in the case of the CTEA. The benefits
of this legislation are concentrated on a relatively small number of individuals and companies who can
afford to set aside a percentage of their potential benefit for lobbying. The costs of copyright term
extension, on the other hand, are diffuse. These costs are paid, in small amounts, by just about every
American, and they are paid in such a way that the extra cost to Americans is not directly identified with
the legislation that creates the cost. Some of the heaviest costs of term extension-the loss of works not
created or not performed because of the transaction costs of copyright licensing-may not be felt by
individual members of the public. Few consumers can know what works have not been created or
performed due to copyright licensing difficulties.").
30 See infra Part I.
31 See infra Part 1.
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I will consider recent cases where copyright owners sought to quell uses of public
domain content by deploying copyrights in related works. I will then consider how
these cases would be decided differently if we applied the public trust doctrine. The
article concludes with a call to action for those interested in ensuring broad and rich
access to public domain content.
I. COMMON LAW PROPERTY MAY OFFER LIMITS TO IP DOCTRINE
A. Conceiving ofIP as Property Does Not Necessitate More IP Protection
The question of whether copyright, trademark, and patent are property regimes
has been considered often.32 This is, of course, no mere semantic or rhetorical
concern. Rather, as the argument goes, conceiving of these regimes as property has
consequences in our policy and jurisprudence." In fact, a very compelling
argument has been made that thinking of the right of publicity as a type of property,
rather than a species of privacy protection, is how some jurisdictions justify post-
mortem protections while others steadfastly refuse to do so.34
The battle lines in this discussion have been drawn. The accepted narrative is
that those who would call the protections for information "property" are doing so in
an effort to expand those protections, while those who question whether copyright,
patent, and trademark are properly understood as something other than property
want to limit those protections." But, the briefest glimpse beneath the veil of that
narrative belies such a simplistic dichotomy. As an initial matter, common law
property contains more than rights, it also includes limitations upon those rights.36
32 See, e.g., Stephen L. Carter, Does it Matter Whether Intellectual Property is Property,
68 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 715 (1993) (discussing generally the common thought processes surrounding the
question of whether or not intellectual property is "property" as the latter is commonly thought of in the
legal community).
33 
See WILLIAM W. FISHER Ell, THE GROWTH OF INTELLECIUAL PROPERTY: A HISTORY OF THE OWNERSHIP
OF IDEAS IN THE UNTIED STATES 22 (1999), httpS//cyber.harvard.edu/people/tfisher/iphistory.pdf
[https//permacc/52JH-URSF] ("Why does the popularity of the term [intellectual property] matter? The
answer-as the Legal Realists recognized long ago-is that legal discourse has power. Specifically, the use of the
term 'property' to describe copyrights, patents, trademarks, etc. conveys the impression that they are fundamentally
'like' interests in land or tangible personal property-and should be protected with the same generous panoply of
remedies.").
1 See Jennifer E. Rothman, The Inalienable Right of Publicity, 101 GEO. LJ. 185, 203 (2012) ("Privacy
rights terminate with the death of the privacy-holder. Once a person is dead, she can no longer suffer the dignitary
or emotional harms that flow from a violation of privacy rights. Because the right of publicity has often been
treated as a property right, many courts and scholars have concluded, without further reflection, that it-unlike a
privacy right-is capable of being devised or bequeathed upon death.").
s See, e.g., David Fagundes, Property Rhetoric and the Public Domain, 94 MINN. L. REV. 652,
658-72 (2010) (discussing this dichotomy as "property romance and property anxiety").
36 See id at 677 ("It is thus understandable that both property romance and property anxiety proceed
on the assumption that talking about IP in the language of traditional property will yield a broader view
of owners' copyright and patent protections. After all, the ownership discourse on which each of these
perspectives relies is the prevalent way of thinking about property in American culture (although not
necessarily within the legal academy). Yet this one-sided approach to property is more myth than
reality. What property romance and anxiety each miss is that there are not one, but many discourses of
6352018-2019
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One of the most ancient of these limitations is the common law's command that the
use of one's property cannot infringe upon the rights of another to use his or her
property-sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas.Y This is, of course, the property
conception underlying the common law nuisance tort which has been present in
Anglo-American law for hundreds of years.3 8
Likewise, common law property principles imported into intellectual property
discourse and jurisprudence do not always function to broaden or strengthen
intellectual property. The next section of this article will consider prior arguments
for importation into intellectual property of common law property principles which
limit the rights of owners.
B. Deploying Common Law Property Principles to Limit IP
Michael Carrier's article, Cabining Intellectual Property Through a Property
Paradigm, suggests that rather than fight against the "propertization" of copyright,
trademark, patent, and right of publicity, IP scholars would be better served by
utilizing the property framework to import some of the extant limitations from the
common law of property.39 While Carrier's article provides a theoretical
framework for how such an importation might work, he specifically declines to
"map particular property doctrines onto IP."o Others, though, have suggested the
application of specific property doctrines, including adverse possession,41 the
numerus clausus principle,42 usufruct,43 and even, the public trust doctrine."
property, and that the ownership discourse is only one way to talk about what possession means. A
counter-narrative to this way of thinking deemphasizes the centrality of owners and instead regards
property as a system that structures social relationships with resources. This alternative view-what I'll
call the 'social discourse of property'-suggests that focusing primarily on private, individual
ownership ignores the full range of functions served by property and blinds us to the ways that property
is a communal institution that creates and epends on social relationships.").
" See Jeremiah Smith, Reasonable Use of One's Own Property as a Justification for Damage to a
Neighbor, 17 COLUM. L. REV. 383, 384-90 (1917) ("A landowner's 'so-called absolute legal control of
his own soil' is 'far from being unlimited.' It is obvious that unless the rights of individual landowners
are modified and limited they must be frequently in conflict one with another. No landowner can always
do as he pleases, except by preventing other landowners from doing as they please. 'The rule governing
the rights of adjacent landowners in the use of their property, seeks an adjustment of conflicting interests
through a reconciliation by compromise, each surrendering something of his absolute freedom so that
both may live."') (footnotes omitted).
38 See John R. Nolon, Historical Overview of the American Land Use System: A Diagnostic
Approach to Evaluating Governmental Land Use Control, 23 PACE ENVTL. L. REv. 821, 823 (2006)
("The powerful right of individuals to use their land under the common law was balanced to a degree by
the doctrine of nuisance, which established that private landowners might not use their property in a way
that was injurious to property held by others.") (citing Aldreds Case, [1611] 9 Coke R.D.F. 57b).
" Michael A. Carrier, Cabining Intellectual Property Through a Property Paradigm,
54 DUKE L. J. 1, 5-6 (2004).
4 Id. at 83.
41 See, e.g., Constance E. Bagley & Gavin Clarkson, Adverse Possession for Intellectual
Property: Adapting an Ancient Concept o Resolve Conflicts Between Antitrust and Intellectual Property
Laws in the Information Age, 16 HARv. J. L. & TECH. 327, 330 & 365-73 (2003) (proposing the
"application of the real property concept of adverse possession in the intellectual property arena").
42 See, e.g., Christina Mulligan, A Numerus Clausus Principle for Intellectual Property,
636 Vol. 107
LIMITING LESSONS
Taking up these suggestions and deepening the existing consideration of the public
trust doctrine is particularly timely in light of the imminence of infusing some of
the most famous works of the twentieth century into the public domain.
While this discussion regarding limiting concepts from property has been
happening in academia, practitioners have also tried, albeit unsuccessfully, to
advance the public trust doctrine as a limit on copyright. In fact, in Eldred v.
Reno,45 the District Court for the District of Columbia rejected the plaintiffs'
assertion that the public trust doctrine disallowed Congress from extending the
duration of existing copyrights.46 The District Court stated, summarily, "[i]nsofar
as the public trust doctrine applies to navigable waters and not copyrights, the
retroactive extension of copyright protection does not violate the public trust
doctrine."' This reading of the public trust doctrine is quite narrow. As the
doctrine has developed in America, legal scholars and practitioners have aimed to
broaden both the types of property to which the doctrine can apply and the types of
public rights to which the doctrine might pertain. In order to understand the
potential breadth of the public trust doctrine, a brief exposition of the doctrine is in
order.
II. THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE: AN ANCIENT PRINCIPLE WITH MODERN
RELEVANCE
A. The Public Trust Doctrine in Antiquity
There is some discrepancy in the literature about where and when the public
trust doctrine originated.4 8 American jurists trace the doctrine in Anglo-American
jurisprudence back to the Magna Carta.49 Commentators suggest that, in fact, the
doctrine was not fully accepted in England until after the American Revolution."o
80 TENN. L. REV. 235, 265-68 (2013) ("In effect, the numerus clausus principle could be active in
particular 'pockets' of the intellectual property legal landscape-local areas where the social costs of
infinitely customizable property rights are higher than the costs of standardized property rights.").
43 See, e.g., Eric R. Claeys, Intellectual Usufructs: Trade Secrets, Hot News, and the Usufructuary
Paradigm at Common Law, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE COMMON LAw 11-32 (Shyam
Balganesh ed. 2012).
" See, e.g., Sandeen, supra note 26, at 414-18; Sun, supra note 28, at 51-57.
45 74 F. Supp. 2d I (D.D.C. 1999).
4 Id. at 3.
47 Id. at 4.
4 See, e.g., James L. Huffman, Speaking of Inconvenient Truths-A History of the Public Trust
Doctrine, 18 DUKE ENvTL. L. & POL'Y F. 1, 12-19 (2007) ("An enthusiastic Yale law student ... urged
'proponents of the public trust ... [to] hold the original Roman law up as a useful model of a doctrinal
purity to which we should return.' . . . As we shall see, it turns out Roman citizens had no such rights.").
4 Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Promise, and Inherently Public Property, 53
U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 728 (1986) ("Although American and English jurists confidently espoused the
sovereign's 'trust' ownership of the tidelands as if it dated at least from Magna Carta, strong evidence
exists that the theory originated much more recently.").
so See, e.g., Glenn J. MacGrady, The Navigability Concept in the Civil and Common Law:
Historical Development, Current Importance, and Some Doctrines That Don't Hold Water, 3 FLA. ST.
U. L. REv. 511, 590 (1975) ("[T]here was no public trust doctrine in England relating to Crown
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This controversy notwithstanding, it is clear that to the extent that the public trust
doctrine can be traced back to Rome and the Magna Carta, it is the limited version
pertaining to navigable waters for use in fishing, specifically." To understand the
development of the doctrine in the American context, we must cross the Atlantic
and begin in the l 96 Century.
B. The Public Trust Doctrine in American Jurisprudence
Since 1842, the public trust doctrine has been recognized by the U.S. Supreme
Court as a part of the American common law.5 2 The Supreme Court, in what is
widely recognized as its first articulation of the public trust doctrine, stated:
When the Revolution took place, the people of each state became
themselves sovereign; and in that character held the absolute right to all
their navigabl. waters, and the soils under them, for their ow a common
use, subject only to the rights since surrendered by the constitution to the
general government.53
In that case, the Court was called upon to consider whether the exclusive rights
in a fishery in Raritan Bay, which was claimed by way of a charter granted to the
Duke of York, persisted after the surrender of all governmental rights back to the
crown and therefore were, at the time of the litigation, vested in the Duke of York's
successor in title.54 The Court held that such rights were necessarily surrendered
back to the Crown as they were a normal incident of government at the time of the
surrender.ss
The Court stated:
The dominion and property in navigable waters and the lands under
them, being held by the King as a public trust, the grant to an individual
of an exclusive fishery in any portion of it, is so much taken from the
common fund intrusted to his care for the common benefit. In such
cases, whatever does not pass by the grant remains in the Crown for the
benefit and advantage of the whole community. Grants of that
ownership of submerged beds and the foreshore at the time of the American Revolution. As a matter of
English fact, the beds and shores of virtually all navigable waters, tidal and nontidal, were privately
owned. As for English law on the subject of foreshore ownership as of 1776.... Attorney General v.
Richards, the first English case to recognize the prima facie rule of Crown ownership of the foreshore,
was not decided until 1795, and Hale's De Jure Maris was not published until 1786. Thus in 1776 there
was virtually no received English law on Crown ownership of the foreshore.").
" Huffman, supra note 48, at 15.
52 See Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. 367, 367-68 (1842). For a discussion of the history of the public
trust doctrine in American jurisprudence, see Rose, supra note 49, at 726-30 (noting that the earliest
American case recognizing the public trust doctrine was Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1 (1821)).
" Martin, 41 U.S. at 367.
* Id. at 369-371.
s Id. at 373.
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description are, therefore, construed strictly; and it will not be presumed
that the King intended to part from any portion of the public domain,
unless clear and special words are used to denote it.5 6
The Court went on to say:
The policy of England since Magna Charta -- for the last six hundred
years -- has been carefully preserved; to secure the common right of
piscary for the benefit of the public. It would require plain language in
the letters patent to the Duke of York, to persuade the Court that the
public and common right of fishing in navigable waters, which has been
so long and so carefully guarded in England, and which was preserved in
every other colony founded on the Atlantic borders, was intended in this
one instance to be taken away. There is nothing in the charter that
requires this conclusion.57
Even in this very early decision, the Supreme Court recognized that the rights
of citizens in the navigable waters extended beyond fishing to include recreational
uses." While there is some dispute over whether the right to recreational uses of
the navigable waters of the United States comes to us from the English common
law," since as early as 1972, a court of last instance, the New Jersey State Supreme
Court, had "no difficulty in finding that, in [the] latter half of the twentieth century,
the public rights in tidal lands are not limited to the ancient prerogatives of
navigation and fishing, but extend as well to recreational uses, including bathing,
swimming and other shore activities."
This recreational use reading of the public trust doctrine is, of course, of some
relevance to our consideration of whether the public trust doctrine has applicability
to the public domain. What it suggests is that even those who seek to use public
domain content for uses that may not be universally regarded as productive should
have some rights to use that content without having to worry about claims of
6 Id. at 368.
ss Id. at 414 ("In all of [the original thirteen colonies], from the time of the settlement to the present
day, the previous habits and usages of the colonists have been respected, and they have been accustomed
to enjoy in common the benefits and advantages of the navigable waters for the same purposes, and to
the same extent, that they have been used and enjoyed for centuries in England. Indeed, it could not well
have been otherwise; for the men who first formed the English settlements, could not have been
expected to encounter the many hardships that unavoidably attended their emigration to the new world,
and to people the banks of its bays and rivers, if the land under the water at their very doors was liable to
immediate appropriation by another as private property; and the settler upon the fast land thereby
excluded from its enjoyment, and unable to take a shellfish from its bottom or fasten there a stake, or
even bathe in its waters without becoming a trespasser upon the rights of another. The usage in New
Jersey has, in this respect, from its original settlement, conformed to the practice of the other chartered
colonies. And it would require very plain language in these letters patent to persuade us that the public
and common right of fishery in navigable waters, which has been so long and so carefully guarded in
England and which was preserved in every other colony founded on the Atlantic borders, was intended
in this one instance to be taken away. But we see nothing in the charter to require this conclusion.").
" See Blundell v. Catterall (1821), 106 Eng. Rep. 1190, 1190; 5 B. & Ald. 268, 268.
6 Borough ofNeptune City v. Borough ofAvon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 54 (N.J. 1972).
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infringement by those that own related content which may still be under copyright.
Of course, the public trust doctrine has lessons to teach about the limitations upon
those adjacent content owners' rights as well.
In Raleigh Ave. Beach Ass'n v. Atlantis Beach Club, Inc., the New Jersey
Supreme Court applied the public trust doctrine to allow members of the public use
of the dry sand area of privately-owned beaches in certain circumstances.6 ' The
factors New Jersey courts use to determine whether the public needs access to
particular dry sand areas were first articulated in Matthews v. Bay Head
Improvement Ass'n.62 These were distilled in Raleigh Avenue, as follows:
(1) location of the dry sand area in relation to the foreshore; (2) extent and
availability of publicly owned upland sand area; (3) nature and extent of the public
demand; and (4) usage of the upland sand land by the owner.6 1 These factors may
help us to fashion some principled way to determine what the relationship between
the works in the public domain and related works still protected by copyright ought
to be. Before moving on to that consideration, though, it is important to consider
some of the modem expansions of the public trust doctrine and whether those
suggest a way to apply the public trust doctrine in the new context of copyright.
C. Modern Applications of the Ancient Principle
In recent years, the public trust doctrine has been deployed for far more than
access to beaches. In a widely cited article, Joseph Sax argued that champions of
environmental protection could utilize the public trust doctrine to advance that
cause.' Professor Sax's article represented a brand new use for the public trust
doctrine and an expansion of the types of property to which the doctrine would
apply to include not only navigable waters, but any resource in need of government
stewardship.6 s Where the doctrine had previously been deployed to demand access,
Sax suggested that it could be used to conserve resources.' A number of recent
61 Raleigh Ave. Beach Ass'n v. Atlantis Beach Club, Inc., 879 A.2d 112, 113 (NJ. 2005).
62 471 A.2d 355, 365 (N.J. 1984).
6 Raleigh Avenue, 879 A.2d at 121-22.
6 Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial
Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REv. 471, 474 (1970).
65 See Carol M. Rose, Joseph Sax and the Idea of the Public Trust, 25 ECOLOGY L. Q. 351, 352
(1998) ("Joseph Sax's 1970 article, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resources Law, ushered in the
next and most recent major revival of the public trust concept Sax returned to the old but persistent
legal idea-that at least some resources or properties are especially subject to public claims-but
unhooked it from its traditional moorings on or around water bodies and applied it to dry land as well.
He himself has referred to the concept of the pub[l]ic trust in his discussions of the takings doctrine,
historical and cultural resources, and a variety of ecological resources. More than that, simply by dusting
off this venerable phrase, Sax's Public Trust Doctrine article added a powerful, if controversial,
rhetorical element to the discussion of these resource areas.") (footnotes omitted).
" Jedidiah Brewer and Gary D. Libecap, Property Rights and the Public Trust Doctrine in
Environmental Protection and Natural Resource Conservation, 53 THE AUSTRALIAN J. OF AGRIC. AND
RESOURCE ECON. 1, 1-2 (2009) ("In 1970, at the time of the rise of the modern environmental
movement, Professor Joseph Sax argued that the public trust doctrine could be employed as a powerful
tool for 'effective judicial intervention' on behalf of environmental protection and natural resource
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cases have taken precisely this tact, asserting that the government's failure to
conserve various natural resources constitutes a breach of the public trust doctrine,
with mixed results.67 Others have sought to utilize the doctrine even outside of the
context of natural resources.
In In re City of Detroit, several parties argued that the art owned by the City of
Detroit, and housed at the Detroit Institute of Arts Museum, could not be sold to
satisfy the City's debt in the process of its bankruptcy proceeding." The Court
agreed with this argument, stating:
Th[ere] is strong evidence that the DIA was founded for the benefit of
the residents of the City and the State, that the City believed that this
was the case when the City received title to the art in 1919, and that the
City has treated the DIA as a public trust for over one hundred years.6 9
While scholars quickly criticized this finding,"o the Court's openness to this
argument certainly represented an extension of the public trust doctrine in a manner
that could suggest a willingness to also extend the doctrine into the intellectual
property arena. It's important to note, though, that the decision itself does not
represent such an extension as the property at issue in Detroit's bankruptcy was the
chattel, the artworks themselves, rather than any underlying copyrights." That begs
the question, of course, of what it might look like to extend the doctrine into the
copyright space.
III. APPLYING THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE IN COPYRIGHT
To begin discussing deploying the public trust doctrine in the context of
copyright, we must return to the Copyright Term Extension Act ("CTEA"). 72 In
conservation.").
6 See, e.g., Pa. Envtl. Def Found. v. Commonwealth, 161 A.3d 911, 916 (Pa. 2017) ("Because state
parks and forests, including the oil and gas minerals therein, are part of the corpus of Pennsylvania's
environmental public trust, we hold that the Commonwealth, as trustee, must manage them according to
the plain language of Section 27, which imposes fiduciary duties consistent with Pennsylvania trust
law."); Ctr. for Biological Diversity, Inc. v. FPL Grp., Inc., 166 Cal.App.4th 1349, 1354 (Cal. Ct. App.
2008) ("Wildlife, including birds, is considered to be a public trust resource of all the people of the state,
and private parties have the right to bring an action to enforce the public trust. Nonetheless, . . . [t]he
proper means to challenge the adequacy of those measures i by petition for a writ of mandate or request
for other appropriate relief brought against those agencies.").
6 In re City ofDetroit, 524 B.R. 147, 176 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2014) ("Several parties, including at
times the City itself, have taken the position that the City holds title to several significant pieces of art in
the DIA and has the right to sell them outright to pay its obligations to creditors. Several other parties,
including the State Attorney General and the DIA, have taken the position that the art that the City
purchased or that others contributed to it is held in public trust for the citizens of the City and the State,
and cannot be sold to satisfy the City's debts.").
69 Id. at 178.
'o E.g., Brian L. Frye, Art & the "Public Trust" in Municipal Bankruptcy, 93 U. DEr. MERCY L. REV. 627,
637-38 (2016) ("The public trust doctrine is irrelevant, as it does not and should not apply to works of art").
71 See City ofDetroit, 524 BR. at 176.
72 Pub. L. No. 105-298, tit. I, § 101, 112 Stat 2827, 2827 (1998) (codified as amended in scattered
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Eldred v. Reno, the plaintiffs asserted a public trust doctrine argument.
Specifically, the plaintiffs argued that "[t]he Public Trust [d]octrine [s]hould [b]e
[c]onstrued as a [c]onstitutional [c]onstraint upon [fJederal [l]aw."7 4 In the
plaintiffs' formulation, during the term of the copyright, the copyright owner has a
present possessory interest in the work while the government is holding a future
interest in trust for the public." The extension of the term that pertains to all
copyrights necessarily decreases the value of that future interest and, as such, is in
violation of the public trust doctrine." While I agree with this argument, as noted
above, this argument never made it past the District Court in that litigation.77 It is
also distinct from the argument I am advancing here. Practically, I am not
suggesting the public trust doctrine as a constraint on the legislative power of
Congress. Rather, I am asserting that we ought to treat public domain content in a
similar manner to the way we treat another commons viewed as important for the
people to thrive-navigable waters." Rather than seeking to constrain the
legislature, I am simply seeking to recognize that just as in the context of real
property, the owner of intellectual property must recognize that there may be times
when those rights must cede to the needs of the public to access the commons."
This claim is distinct from the argument advanced in the CTEA litigation because it
does not rely on the future interest that was alleged to reside in the public to items
which should have entered the public domain. Rather, it returns to the roots of
public trust doctrine theory in recognizing that there are necessarily instances in
which a private party's rights must give way to the greater interest of public access.
In the context of copyright, that commons is referred to as the public domain.o
What immediately follows is a consideration of how courts have conceived of the
sections of 17 U.S.C. (2000)).
7 Plaintiffs' Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion For Judgment on the Pleadings or in the
Alternative for Summary Judgment at 23-25, Eldred v. Reno, 74 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 1999) (No.
1:99CV00065 JLG).
74 
Id. at 23.
7 See id. at 23-24.
76 See id at 24-25.
n Eldred v. Reno, 74 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4 (D.D.C. 1999); see also supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
78 See infra notes 114-117 and accompanying text.
7 See infra notes 114-115 and accompanying text.
* This idea is illustrated by Anupam Chandler & Madhavi Sunder:
Central to most definitions of the public domain is the notion that resources therein are
available broadly for access and use. Just as property consists in a varying bundle of rights
revolving around a central right to exclude, the public domain consists in a varying bundle of
rights revolving around the right to access and use.. . . [S]cholarship has assumed that such
access and use cannot be conditioned on the payment of a substantial price. Accordingly, we
offer the following definition: Public domain: Resources for which legal rights to access and
use for free (or for nominal sums) are held broadly. Adopting such a capacious definition, it
becomes unnecessary to distinguish public domain from "commons." Both terms have an
intertwined past and an interrelated present. While the "public domain" often refers to
resources to which there are rights of access shared among all people ....
Anupam Chandler & Madhavi Sunder, The Romance of the Public Domain, 92 CALIF. L.
REV. 1331, 1338 (2004).
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nature of the public domain.
A. The Parameters ofAccess to Public Domain Content
Before Golan v. Holder, it had long been received wisdom that once a work
was in the public domain, it was there forever." The Supreme Court soundly
rejected that notion, though the understanding of irretrievability was previously
articulated by the Supreme Court to be "federal policy" found in the Intellectual
Property clause of the Constitution and "the implementing federal statutes."82 The
Golan Court completely spurned the idea that members of the public have any
interest in the public domain. The majority opinion stated:
As petitioners put it in this Court, Congress impermissibly revoked their
right to exploit foreign works that "belonged to them" once the works
were in the public domain.
To copyright lawyers, the "vested rights" formulation might sound
exactly backwards: Rights typically vest at the outset of copyright
protection, in an author or rightholder. Once the term of protection ends,
the works do not revest in any rightholder. Instead, the works simply
lapse into the public domain. Anyone has free access to the public
domain, but no one, after the copyright term has expired, acquires
ownership rights in the once-protected works.13
This was, of course, exactly contrary to the prior received wisdom. Experts
contemporaneously quipped, "[t]his decision [Golan] marked a significant
departure from the 'bedrock principle' that once works enter the public domain,
they remain there, free for anyone to use and build upon."' The Court, recognizing
this departure, tried to limit its holding on the basis of Congressional power stating,
"[g]iven the authority we hold Congress has, we will not second-guess the political
choice Congress made between leaving the public domain untouched and
embracing Berne unstintingly."s Nonetheless, the decision was broadly read as a
blow to the public domain." While Golan concerned Congress' authority to
" See Golan v. Holder, 565 U.S. 302, 308 (2012).
82 Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 237 (1964).
83 Golan, 565 U.S. at 331-32 (citations omitted).
" James Boyle & Jennifer Jenkins, Public by Sufferance Alone: The Worst of 2012,
HUFFPOST (Jan. 10, 2013), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/james-boyle/public-by-sufferance-
alon_b_2443850.html [https://perma.cc/MS3X-JSWX].
8 Golan, 565 U.S. at 324.
16 See, e.g., Melissa Levine, Golan v. Holder: In Praise of Breyer's Dissent, MICH. PUBL'G (Jan. 25, 2012),
https://www.publishing.umich.edu/2012/01/25/golan-holder-breyer/ [https://penna.cd2477-8TZ2] (expressing the
belief that 'i]n one fell swoop, the majority [of the Golan Court] managed to express a legal opinion out of touch
with technological and social reality or related changes in communication"); Nicholas O'Donnell,
Golan v Holder-Foreign Works in Public Domain Back Under Copyright, SULLIVAN & WORCESTER (Mar. 7,
2012), https://blog-sandw.com/artlawrport/2012/03/07/golan-v-holder-foreign-works-in-public-domain-back-
under-copyright/ [https//permaccXCH9-BK2Q] (asserting that the Golan "decision raises far-reaching
implications for anyone who has copied, sold, or otherwise published foreign works of the 20' century that were
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remove items from the public domain, and Eldred v. Ashcroft before it had
considered the question of Congress' authority to forestall large scale addition to
the public domain,87 in light of the imminence of fresh annual infusions into the
public domain, those interested in accessing work that is unquestionably in the
public domain would do well to consider how courts treat cases where related
works continue to be protected by copyright. What follows is a consideration of
such cases. Immediately below, I'll discuss three recent cases that demonstrate that
such access is, in fact, imperiled. Courts often extend protection from copyrighted
works to disallow uses of public domain content. When they don't, it is often for
exceedingly narrow reasons that do little to ensure wide access to public domain
content.
B. Cordoning Off the Public Domain by Weaponizing Extant Copyright
i. Extending Existing Copyrights to Limit Use of Public Domain Content
The Northern District of Georgia in Code Revision Comm'n v.
PublicResource.Org, Inc., recognized that statutory language itself is not
copyrightable and nonetheless held that the Official Code of Georgia Annotated
was, in fact, copyrightable and copyrighted." In acknowledging that the statutory
language could not be copyrighted, the court cited to the Compendium of U.S.
Copyright Office Practices," which expresses "longstanding public policy [of] the
U.S. Copyright Office [that it] will not register a government edict that has been
issued by any state, local, or territorial government, including legislative
enactments, judicial decisions, administrative rulings, public ordinances, or similar
types of official legal materials."" This longstanding policy reflects an
understanding that the law of the land is properly in the public domain. As such, no
work of the United States government is protected by copyright." The Copyright
Office has read this prohibition against copyrighting works of the United States
government broadly. The provision in the Compendium regarding federal
government works reads expansively:
This includes legislation enacted by Congress, decisions issued by the
federal judiciary, regulations issued by a federal agency, or any other
work prepared by an officer or employee of the U.S. federal government
assumed to be in the public domain"); Jeffrey R Young, Supreme Court Up7holds Law that Pulled Foreign Works
Back Under Copyright, THE CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDuC. (Jan. 18, 2012),
https://www.chronicle.com/article/Supreme-Court-Upholds-Law-That/130376 [httpsJ/pernaccdM3DX-6E51
(asserting that the Golan decision "wsill affect scholars and artists around the county').
8 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 192-93 (2003).
" Code Revision Comm'n v. PublicResource.Og, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 3d 1350,1356-57 (N.D. Ga. 2017).
89 Id. at 1356.
9 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES THIRD EDITION
§ 313.6(C)(1) (2017).
9 17 U.S.C. § 105 (2012) ("Copyright protection under this title is not available for any work of the
United States Government . . .").
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while acting within the course of his or her official duties. It also
includes works prepared by an officer or employee of the government of
the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or the
organized territories under the jurisdiction of the federal government.92
This expansive prohibition does not apply to the States.93 Neither the Copyright
Office nor the Northern District of Georgia explains the reasoning behind the
public policy of dedicating the law to the public domain. While the Eleventh
Circuit's recent decision in the case would endeavor to provide the explanation,
its reasoning is so narrow as to foreclose application of the case outside of the
context of cases regarding content which would be copyrightable but for its status
as law or law-like.' The Northern District of Georgia nonetheless went on to
find that the annotations, ordered by the Commission, the drafting of which was
supervised by the Commission and once integrated with the statutory language,
the content of which was ratified by the Georgia Legislature, was copyrightable
and rendered the Official Code of Georgia, including the annotations,
copyrightable.s On that reasoning, the court granted an injunction against Public
Resource.Org's publication and dissemination of the O.C.G.A."
The opinion of the Northern District of Georgia begs the question-why should
access to federal law be more readily available than access to the official code of
the State of Georgia or any other document with the force of law? The Eleventh
Circuit's decision in the case handily addresses this question.97 Unfortunately, it is
not up to the task of explaining why public access necessitates negating copyright
protectability, in the first place. This second question is particularly perplexing
given that there is a great deal of jurisprudence and scholarship suggesting that
copyright itself is the engine of dissemination/access." Neither does it help us to
conceptualize of the relative rights and interests of a copyright owner versus the
public in cases where the copyrighted content in question is adjacent to content
that is unquestionably in the public domain, as the statutory language in the case
undoubtedly was. The public trust doctrine, might serve as a useful model for
Courts considering cases like Code Revision Commission v. Public.Resource.Org,
Inc. to answer that question.
92 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES THIRD EDITION
§ 313.6(C)(1) (2017).
93 Public.Resource.Org, 906 F.3d at 1239 ("This partial codification of Banks for works created by
the federal government leaves unmodified the rule as it applies to works created by the states.")
(referencing Banks v. Manchester, 128 U.S. 244 (1888) , the rule of which the Public Resource Org
Court articulated as "government edicts cannot be copyrighted.").
9 See infra notes 107-113 and accompanying text.
9s PublicResource.Org, 244 F. Supp. 3d at 1356-57.
9 Id. at 1361.
9 See infra notes 108-111 and accompanying text.
9 See Golan v. Holder, 565 U.S. 302, 304-05 (2012) ("Recognizing that some restriction on expression is the
inherent and intended effect of every grant of copyright, the Court observed that the Framers reganied copyright
protection not simply as a limit on the manner in which expressive works may be used, but also as an 'engine of
free expression."') (citing Eldredv. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186,219 (2003)).
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ii. An Anemic View of the Public Domain
Code Revision Commission v. Public.Resource.org, Inc., is merely one example
of courts restricting access to public domain content. Six years earlier in Warner
Brothers v. X One X Prods., the District Court of Missouri and then the Eighth
Circuit had held that certain uses of works in the public domain could infringe
other, related works that remained under copyright protection, essentially extending
the protection of the copyrighted works to severely limit the use of the public
domain works.99 In the Warner Brothers cases, the works in question had never
been protected by copyright, as they were published without notice during the
period in which securing copyright protection required adhering to statutory
formalities.0 The Plaintiff asserted that use of the public domain works on t-shirts
constituted infringement of the related films which remained under copyright.'0 '
Both the Distnct Court and the Eighth Circuit ultimately curtailed the Defendant's
uses of the public domain content pretty stringently, holding that certain uses of the
public domain works could, in fact, infringe upon the copyrights in the related
films.102 A more recent decision out of the Seventh Circuit seems a move in the
right direction in terms of how courts should treat items in the public domain.
Though, I'll suggest, that move is not quite far enough in the right direction.
In the dispute between Leslie S. Klinger and Conan Doyle Estate, Ltd., the
Northern District of Illinois and the Seventh Circuit get closer than any court has
recently to circumscribing a copyright owner's ability to utilize existing copyrights
to disallow use of public domain content.'03 In that case, the Conan Doyle Estate
had argued that though most of the stories written by Sir Arthur Conan Doyle were
in the public domain by virtue of the fact that they were published in the United
States before 1923, the characters, Sherlock Holmes and Dr. Watson, remained
under copyright because ten stories remained under copyright.'" Both the District
Court and the Seventh Circuit rejected that argument.'0 While these decisions
certainly represent an improvement over the constrained access provided for in
Warner Brothers," they don't go far enough, in that, like in Warner Brothers, they
require punctilious factual proof that the new user's use of the public domain
content does not amount to infringement of the copyrighted content. In the
Klinger/Conan Doyle dispute, Klinger was put to the task of demonstrating that
none of the storylines, dialogue, characters or character traits utilized in the
" Warner Bros. Entn't, Inc. v. X One XProds., 644 F.3d 584, 597-99 (8th Cir. 2011).
'00 Id. at 593.
o Id. at 602.
102 Id. at 603; Warner Bros. Entm't v. Dave Grossman Creations, Inc., No. 4:06CV546 HEA, 2010
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19547, at *12-14 (E.D. Mo. 2010).
103 Klinger v. Conan Doyle Estate, Ltd., 988 F. Supp. 2d 879 (N.D. 111. 2013), affd, 755 F.3d 496,
497, 500, 503 (7th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 458 (2014).
'00 Id. at 497-98.
'0 Id. at 503.
1" See supra notes 99-101 and accompanying text.
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anthology that he was seeking to publish was first introduced in the ten works
which remained under copyright.1 07 This, of course, is a daunting task that places
the onus of ensuring access to public domain materials squarely on each and every
potential follow-on user. Not only must you ensure that the work that you are
utilizing is in the public domain, you must also endeavor to ensure that nothing in
your new work could infringe related copyrighted content. There seems no question
that such a requirement would have a chilling effect on those seeking to utilize
public domain materials. In Section C. below, I'll suggest an alternative. First,
though, the Eleventh Circuit's reversal of the Northern District of Georgia's
decision in Code Revision Comm'n v. Public.Resource.org, Inc. bears analysis if
for no other reason than that it allows for public access to a certain type of
work-content having the force of law-without advancing the broader claim to
access to public domain materials in any significant way.
iii. Getting to the Right Result in Precisely the Wrong Way
The Eleventh Circuit's decision in Code Revision Comm'n v.
Public.Resource.org, Inc. vindicates the public's rights to access the content in
question."os While the decision can be read as a powerful victory for those, like the
individual behind Public.Resource.org, who are interested in the public having
access to law and regulations, it does little for those interested in ensuring access to
public domain content more broadly. Further, the Eleventh Circuit noted that its
decision was made based on "characteristics that are the hallmarks of law."'" In
particular, the Eleventh Circuit stated that it would "rely on the identity of the
public officials who created the work, the authoritativeness of the work, and the
process by which the work was created." ' 0 The Eleventh Circuit explained that:
[W]ith respect to certain governmental works, the term "author" should
be construed to mean "the People," so that the general public is treated
as the owner of the work. This means that a work subject to the rule is
inherently public domain material and thus not eligible for copyright
protection."'
The Court's ruling is limited in two ways, which would make it basically
inapposite in most copyright cases. First, the Court specifically limits its decision
to copyrightability of content which has the force of law." 2 In doing so, it relies
heavily on a niche set of precedents having little to no applicability outside of the
context of determining the copyrightability of legal promulgations."3 The
107 Klinger, 988 F. Supp. 2d at 893.
'0 Code Revision Commn v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 906 F.3d 1229, 1255 (1 Ith Cir. 2018).
' 0' Id. at 1232.
o Id
". Id. at 1236.
112 Id. at 1242.
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Eleventh Circuit also relied heavily on the Georgia law and process by which the
annotations in question were produced and adopted which suggests that the
applicability of the case may be limited even in the context of cases concerned
with copyrightability of law." 4 A cynic could easily read that decision and conjure
myriad ways that even Georgia could alter its law or process to avoid the Eleventh
Circuit's holding in the future. What follows immediately is a potential alternative
framework for considering questions of access to public domain works that are
related to works in which copyright continues to persist.
C. Public Trust Principles as Ameliorative of Over-Protection Impulses
Professor Sax's groundbreaking 1970 article envisioned a public trust doctrine
expansive enough to embrace the stewardship of not just natural resources but also,
perhaps, cultural resources." The recreational access public trust doctrine cases
center human flourishing as the theoretical underpinning of the public trust doctrine
and provide a model for how we might fashion a public trust doctrine for the public
domain."' This model is appealing for a number of reasons. First, it is easy to map
the issues presented in the beach access cases unto the issues presented in some of
these public domain cases. In both instances, the central question is the public's
access to a longstanding commons-navigable waters, on the one hand, and the
public domain, on the other. And, in both instances, Courts are called upon to
decide the extent to which the public should be able to access that commons in
light of asserted private rights. Moreover, the factors distilled in Raleigh Ave.
Beach Ass'n v. Atlantis Beach Club, Inc. provide a workable framework for taking
the public's interest in access to a commons into account when potentially
conflicting private rights are asserted. There, the New Jersey Supreme Court
considered: (1) location of the dry sand area in relation to the foreshore; (2) extent
and availability of publicly-owned upland sand area; (3) nature and extent of the
public demand; and (4) usage of the upland sand land by the owner." While these
considerations don't map perfectly onto the public domain context, they certainly
suggest some factors courts ought to take into account. These might include (1) the
use the copyright owner is making of the protected work; (2) the ubiquity of the
public domain work in the culture, i.e., the nature and extent of the public demand;
and (3) the extent to which the follow-on users proposed use is likely to deprive the
copyright owner of a reasonable return on investment in the protected work. I
believe that this framework could provide far more balanced determinations in
114 Id. at 1245-48.
"1 Sax, supra note 64, at 557 ("Finally, it must be emphasized that the discussion contained in this
Article applies with equal force to controversies over subjects other than natural resources. While
resource controversies are often particularly dramatic examples of diffuse public interests and contain
all their problems of equality in the political and administrative process, those problems frequently arise
in issues affecting the poor and consumer groups. Only time will reveal the appropriate limits of the
public trust doctrine as a useful judicial instrument.").116 See supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
11 Raleigh Ave. Beach Ass'n v. Atlantis Beach Club, Inc., 879 A.2d at 121 (N.J. 2005).
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cases like Klinger v. Conan Doyle Estate, Ltd., 18 and, hopefully, avoid altogether
suits like Code Revision Comm'n v. Pub.Resource.org, Inc.1 1 9
There are, of course, challenges here. The most obvious of these is figuring out
how the diffuse parties interested in access to public domain content might
effectuate adoption of such a framework. The simplest way forward in that regard
is likely a test case. But, of course, content owners certainly have the resources at
their disposal to fight such a case vigorously. That means, I think, that the onus is
on those interested in access to organize and strategize before works like Steamboat
Willie enter the public domain and users find themselves on the defensive.
CONCLUSION: A CALL TO ACTION
There is no question in my mind that the major content owners, like Disney, are
considering a strategy for limiting access to their content that is imminently
entering the public domain. Even if you don't agree with the prescription I have
offered here - importing the public trust doctrine's protections for access into the
copyright context - it would certainly behoove those of us interested in ensuring
such access to think broadly about the ways that may be accomplished. There is no
question that content owners are far better organized and resourced. Unless those
interested in access strategize, even without legislation like the Copyright Term
Extension Act, content owners who have copyrights on related content can, and
very likely will, tie those who seek to use the new public domain content up in
expensive and time-consuming litigation.
11 755 F.3d 496 (7th Cir. 2014).
"9 906 F.3d 1229 (11th Cir. 2018).
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